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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a security model to capture active attacks against multi-path
key establishment (MPKE) in sensor networks. Our model enhances previous models to cap-
ture more attacks and achieve essential security goals for multi-path key establishment. In this
model, we can apply protocols for perfectly secure message transmission to solve the key estab-
lishment problem. We propose a new protocol for optimal one-round perfectly secure message
transmission based on Reed-Solomon codes. Then we use this protocol to obtain two new multi-
path key establishment schemes that can be applied provided that fewer than one third of the
paths contain an adversary node. Finally, we describe another MPKE scheme that tolerates a
higher fraction (less than 1=2) of paths controlled by the adversary. This scheme is based on a
new protocol for a weakened version of message transmission, which is very simple and ecient.
Our multi-path key establishment schemes achieve improved security and lower communica-
tion complexity, as compared to previous schemes.
1 Introduction
Sensor networks consist of large numbers of wireless sensor nodes which have only limited memory
as well as limited computational and communication capabilities. The sensor nodes are usually
distributed randomly in a certain area for data acquisition and environment monitoring. After
deployment, they operate unattended and without physical protection. They need to communicate
with each other to accumulate data and (possibly) relay the data to a base station. In many
applications, such as battle eld surveillance, communications between sensor nodes have to be
encrypted. At the same time, sensor nodes deployed in a hostile environment are prone to be
captured and compromised.
A commonly recommended key management approach for sensor networks is key predistribution,
which installs cryptographic keys in sensor nodes before the nodes are deployed. Later, after the
sensor nodes are deployed, they discover shared keys with their neighbouring nodes (i.e., within
the wireless communication range of the nodes). If two nodes are in each other's communication
range and they share a common key, then they can encrypt the messages between them using the
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1shared key and hence establish a secure link. A large number of key predistribution schemes have
been proposed in the literature, e.g., [8, 3, 14, 2, 15, 7, 18].
A key predistribution scheme does not guarantee that each pair of nodes share a predistributed
key. For two nodes A and B that do not share a key, they can establish a path key using a secure
multi-hop path between them. On such a path, each two consecutive nodes have a secure link. A
can transport a key K to B via this path. On each hop, K is transported using the secure link,
encrypted using the key shared by the two consecutive nodes.
To enhance the security of a path key, Chan, Perrig and Song [3] and Zhu et al [27] proposed
to use multiple paths to transmit key shares. Suppose that there are m secure paths between A
and B. A could send m key shares s1;:::;sm to B, one share via each path. B recovers the key
K as K = s1    sn. Note that the actual number of such paths can be estimated using the
k-connectivity properties of a sensor network secured by key predistribution schemes (see, e.g.,
[26]).
The path key establishment using K = s1    sn is vulnerable to message dropping or
altering. In [27], Zhu et al also proposed to use an (n;k) secret sharing scheme [22] to compute
the shares and to recover the key. An (n;k) secret sharing scheme generates n shares for a secret
s. With any k of these n shares, the secret s can be recovered. The secret sharing scheme enables
B to recover the key when some shares are dropped. Secret sharing schemes also provide error
correcting ability so that the key can be recovered when some shares are deleted (see [16, 20, 24].
However, the error-correcting ability of the (n;k) secret sharing scheme is not used in [27].
To withstand message dropping and altering attacks, Huang and Mehdi [10] proposed a multi-
path key establishment scheme (the HM scheme) based on Reed-Solomon (RS) code. In the HM
scheme, A chooses a key and encodes it in an RS codeword which consists of multiple symbols.
The symbols are sent to B via multiple paths. RS code provides error-correction ability so that B
can recover the key when some symbols are dropped or altered.
Deng and Han [5] proposed another RS code based multi-path key establishment scheme named
JERT (Just Enough Redundancy Transmission). JERT is designed for two neighbouring nodes
which have a direct but insure communication link, over which B can send feedback to A. Unlike
the HM scheme where A sends out all symbols of a codeword, in JERT, A sends out the symbols
incrementally. When B has received enough symbols and recovers a key, B and A can run an
authentication protocol over their direct link to verify the recovered key. If the key recovered by B
is correct, then A will not send the remaining symbols.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we rst dene a model for multi-path key establishment (MPKE). This model en-
hances the model used in [10] and [5]. We have two specic security objectives:
reliability
The adversary nodes should not be able to prevent B from computing the key K that was
chosen by A.
secrecy
From the point of view of the adversary nodes, the entropy of K (given the information that
they observe) should be suciently high so that they cannot compute K.
The above objectives can be realized using a protocol for perfectly secure message transmission
(PSMT). Constructions and bounds for PSMT have been studied extensively since the 1993 paper
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networks in 2004 by Wang [25].
We propose a new optimal protocol for one-round PSMT based on Reed-Solomon codes. Our
protocol is somewhat similar to a protocol found in Fitzi et al [9]. Then we use our PSMT protocol
to obtain two new multi-path key establishment schemes that can be applied provided that fewer
than one third of the paths contain an adversary node. Our rst scheme works in the same setting
as the HM scheme, where A does not need to receive feedback from B. Our second scheme works
in the same setting as JERT, where A can receive feedback from B to reduce message transmission.
We optimize the parameters of both our proposed schemes so that A uses the minimum transmission
possible for B to recover a secure key.
Finally, we describe another MPKE scheme that tolerates a higher fraction (less than 1=2) of
paths controlled by the adversary. This scheme is based on a new protocol for a weakened version
of message transmission, which is very simple and ecient.
1.2 Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the proposed model and
some preliminary results on secure message transmission, Reed-Solomon codes and key derivation
using resilient functions. In Section 3, we present and analyze the HM and JERT schemes. In
Section 4, we present our rst two new schemes and their analysis. In Section 5, we present our
third scheme, which tolerates a less than 1=2 fraction of paths controlled by the adversary. In
Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 The Model and Some Preliminaries
Our model for multi-path key establishment (MPKE) is an enhancement of the model used in [10]
and [5]. It is described as follows.
1. In a sensor network secured using key predistribution schemes, there often are multiple node-
disjoint paths between a specied source node A and a specied destination node B. Every
two consecutive nodes (i.e., a link) on such a path have a common key, and no two of these
paths contain any common nodes except for A and B. These paths are identied by A before
key establishment takes place. A sends key establishment messages over the paths. Eciency
of the scheme is measured by communication complexity, i.e., the total amount of information
that is transmitted over all the paths.
2. We will assume that a fraction e of these paths (where 0  e < 1=2) contain are controlled
by an adversary. We call e the error rate. A path P is controlled by an adversary if there
exists an adversary that has knowledge of the key corresponding to a link on the path P. We
assume that an adversary controlling a path P can observe, drop or alter any messages that
are transmitted from A to B using the path P.
3. The goal of a key establishment scheme is to enable A and B to establish a key with sucient
entropy. This leads to two security requirements. First, the adversary should not be able to
disrupt the protocol by preventing B from computing the same key K that A holds. Second,
the adversary should be prevented from determining partial information about the established
key. This idea is formalized by considering the entropy of the message M received by B, from
3the point of view of the adversary who collects partial information about M (see Section 2.3.1
for details).
Entropy of the established key is not analyzed in [10] and [5]. However, entropy is a critical
requirement for the established key to be secure, because a key with low entropy can easily be
determined by the adversary by exhaustive search. Key entropy should be considered when
evaluating the scheme, along with eciency.
Remark. An adversary who controls a node N in one of the paths P from A to B has access to
all the keys stored in N. Suppose that one of these keys, say K, is stored by a node N0 in another
path P0 from A to B. Therefore the adversary can read information encrypted using the key K,
and thus the path P0 will not be secure. So the number of paths controlled by the adversary can
be greater than the number of nodes controlled by the adversary. See [25] for more discussion on
this issue.
2.1 Secure Message Transmission
Perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT) was introduced in 1993 by Dolev et al [6]. PSMT
were rst suggested for use in multipath key establishment in sensor networks in 2004 by Wang
[25]. We dene PSMT protocols and summarize some relevant results in this section.
Suppose two parties A and B are connected by p channels. An adversary controls pa (or fewer)
of these channels, but it is not known which channels are controlled by the adversary. The adversary
can observe, delete, or modify the information in these pa channels. An r-round (p;pa)-perfectly
secure message transmission scheme is an interactive protocol between A and B which takes place
in r rounds (denoted as rounds 1;:::;r), such that the following properties are satised:
1. In each odd-numbered round, A sends information to B over each of the p channels connecting
them.
2. In each even-numbered round, B sends information to A over each of the p channels connecting
them.
3. After the rth round, A and B both possess a common key K which is an element of a
prespecied key space K.
4. The adversary has no information on the value of K (so the entropy of K, from the point of
view of the adversary, is logjKj).
The overhead of a PSMT is dened to be the ratio
amount of information transmitted over all p channels
length of the key K
:
There is a large literature on PSMT. For our purposes, we are most interested in one-round
protocols, since these are the simplest and best suited to be applied to multipath key establishment.
It was proven in [6] that a 1-round (p;pa)-perfectly secure message transmission scheme exists if
and only if p  3pa + 1. It is shown in [9] that the overhead of a one-round PSMT satises the
condition
overhead 
p
p   3pa
: (1)
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(i.e., optimal overhead schemes) are constructed in [9].
If 3pa  p  2pa + 1, then all is not lost. It is possible to construct 2-round (p;pa)-PSMT in
these cases [21, 13]. Alternatively, one can obtain one-round schemes that are not perfectly reliable
(i.e., condition 3 in the denition of PSMT is relaxed). Such schemes are constructed in [12, 17].
2.2 Comparison Between PSMT and MPKE
A PSMT assumes multiple channels connecting A and B. The channels not controlled by the
adversary are assumed to provide unconditional secrecy and authenticity. The security of a PSMT
scheme is unconditional, provided that no computational assumptions are made in the analysis of
the protocol. Almost all PSMT in the literature are studied in the setting of unconditional security.
In an MPKE, information is transmitted over links in encrypted form using conventional secret-
key cryptography. Therefore we do not expect an MPKE to provide unconditional security; the
security will depend on the assumption that the encryption and authentication schemes are (com-
putationally) secure. Additional computational assumptions may be required, depending on the
scheme.
2.3 Reed-Solomon Codes
Many PSMT protocols are based on Reed-Solomon codes, which we introduce now. There are
dierent ways to construct RS codes. Each has its encoding and decoding algorithms. Here we
only describe the general functionalities of the encoding/decoding algorithms. For details of the
algorithms, see, e.g., [19, 11]. Simply speaking, the input of the RS encoding algorithm is a
message m = (m0;:::;mk 1) 2 Fk
q where Fq is a nite eld of order q. The output of an RS
encoding algorithm is c = (c0;:::;cn 1) 2 Fn
q where k  n  q. c is called a codeword. Each
co-ordinate in m or c is called a symbol.
If it always happens that ci = mi for 0  i  k   1, then the encoding is systematic. In this
case, m0;:::;mk 1 may be called information symbols and ck;:::;cn 1 may be called parity check
symbols. Not all RS encoding schemes are systematic, however.
The above-described RS code has length n and dimension k. Its distance is d = n   k + 1 (i.e.,
any two distinct codewords dier in at least n   k + 1 symbols).
A Reed-Solomon code is a linear code, which means that the codewords form a k-dimensional
subspace of the vector space Fn
q . A commonly-used method of encoding a linear code is to constuct
a generator matrix, denoted G, whose rows form a basis for the code. Then, to encode a message
m, we compute c = mG.
During transmission, some symbols in a codeword c may be deleted or altered. Suppose that
 of the symbols in c are deleted, and  other symbols in c are altered. Let r be the resulting
received vector. The input of the decoding algorithm is r. The output of the decoding algorithm
is the codeword whose distance from r is minimized. It is a standard result in coding theory that
this decoding algorithm will output c provided that
 + 2 < d: (2)
In the case of an RS code, we have d = n   k + 1 and the condition (2) becomes
 + 2  n   k: (3)
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whether or not the code is systematic.
In the above-described RS code, a message consists of k symbols and a codeword consists of n
(n  k) symbols. The code is termed an (n;k) RS code.
2.3.1 Evaluating the Secrecy of a Message
When RS codes are used to encode and transmit a secret message m = (m0;:::;mk 1), we need to
consider the entropy of m from an adversary's point of view. The original entropy of m is klog2 q
bits. Suppose that i symbols are received by the adversary nodes. If i  k, then the adversary can
recover m, and the entropy of m is 0. If i < k, then the adversary can randomly choose other k i
symbols and recover a (possibly incorrect) message. In this case the adversary recovers the correct
message with probability
1
2(k i)log2 q:
Therefore, when the adversary knows i symbols in m, the entropy of m is
maxf(k   i)log2 q;0g
bits.
2.4 Key Derivation and Resilient Functions
In the protocols we will be describing, the key K, which is derived from a k-tuple m, should have
sucient entropy. We will use the number of symbols, instead of number of bits, to indicate the
entropy. In this terminology, the entropy of a message m is k symbols.
To ensure that K is secure, we desire that m should have entropy at least ` symbols, for some
prespecied value of `. There are several ways to derive K from m while preserving its entropy.
For example, we can use a cryptographic hash function hash to compute K = hash(m). If it holds
that
1. the hash function is modelled as a random oracle,
2. the input of the hash function has entropy at least ` symbols, and
3. the output of the hash function has a length of at least ` symbols,
then the entropy of the derived key K is at least ` symbols (so we say that K is `-secure).
The above approach only provides computational security of the key. An alternative is to use
resilient functions [1, 4] to derive the key. This approach would provide unconditional security of
the key.
Suppose q is a prime power. Let k;`;t be positive integers such that k  ` + t. A (k;`;t;q)-
resilient function, or (k;`;t;q)-RF, is a function f : Fk
q ! F`
q such that f(m) is uniformly dis-
tributed in F`
q whenever any t inputs are xed and the remaining k   t inputs are chosen inde-
pendently and uniformly at random from Fq, e.g., by an adversary (here we are regarding f as a
function with k inputs from Fq).
There is a large body of literature on resilient functions. For our purposes, we need a well-known
class of resilient functions that is derived from Reed-Solomon codes. In fact, any linear code gives
6rise to a linear function. The following was proven for binary codes in [1, 4]. It was observed in
[23] that the same result holds for codes over an arbitrary nite eld.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose q is a prime power, and suppose there exists a linear code over Fq having
length n, dimension k and distance d. Then there exists a (n;k;d   1;q)-RF.
Using Reed-Solomon codes, the following is an immediate corollary.
Corollary 2.2. Suppose q is a prime power such that q  k > `, where k and ` are positive
integers. Then there exists a (k;`;k   `;q)-RF.
The construction of a (k;`;k `;q)-RF is easy. Let G be the generator matrix of a Reed-Solomon
code of dimension ` and length k over Fq. Then f is dened as f(m) = mGT, where GT denotes
the transpose of G.
Remark. The above-described usage of resilient functions has previously been employed in the
literature on PSMT; see, for example, the function EXTRAND in [17, x4.2]. However, the
connection to resilient functions is not made in [17] or in other papers on PSMT.
3 Analysis of the HM and JERT Schemes
3.1 The HM Scheme
The HM scheme [10] is as follows. Let n   k = 2t. The number of adversary nodes is assumed to
be at most t. Suppose that there are p node-disjoint paths between A and B, where 2t < p  k.
A chooses a message m = (m0;:::;mk 1) and uses a systematic (n;k) RS encoding algorithm to
generate a codeword c = (m0;:::;mk 1;b0;:::;b2t 1). m0;:::;mk 1 are k information symbols and
b0;:::;b2t 1 are 2t parity check symbols. Let b = (b0;:::;b2t 1). Then A creates k (2t+1)-tuples,
each of the form mi k b, and sends at most t of the (2t + 1)-tuples on each of the p node-disjoint
paths (note that this requires that k  pt, which is not stated as a necessary condition in [10]).
Since there are at most t paths that contain an adversary node and p > 2t, B can use majority
rule to nd the correct b. It is then claimed in [10] that B can then recover m, but ability to
recover m also depends on how many information symbols have been altered by the adversary. In
fact, we show that B may not be able to recover m at all in many situations. Suppose k > p > 2t
(note that it is assumed that 2t < p  k, so we are just saying that k 6= p). Suppose that each
message symbol is transmitted by one path. Then there is at least one of the p paths, say P0, that
is used to transmit at least two message symbols. If P0 is one of the t paths containing an adversary
node, then the adversary nodes can alter at least t+1 message symbols. However, an RS code can
only correct t errors, so the message cannot be recovered by B.
Another problem with the scheme in [10] is that adversary nodes can obtain information about
the message. Recall that the scheme is supposed to tolerate up to t compromised paths. However,
if t paths contain adversary nodes, then the adversary nodes receive 2t correct parity check symbols
and at least t correct information symbols, and hence by (3) the adversaries collectively are able to
recover m when 3t  k (equivalently, when n  5t). Even when there is only one adversary node,
it will receive 2t parity check symbols and at least one information symbol. Then the entropy of
the key is maxfk   2t   1;0g symbols, which could be very low.
We regard it as a weakness in the scheme for A to send all the 2t parity check symbols on
every path, because for decoding of RS codes, a parity check symbol yields the same amount of
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that the scheme is quite inecient due to the amount of repeated information that is transmitted.
3.2 The JERT Scheme
JERT [5] is designed for two neighbouring nodes that have direct but insecure communication. In
this case, A and B can run a challenge-response authentication protocol over this insecure channel
to verify if they share a common secret key. The communication overhead over the direct link may
be neglected.
Here are the details of the scheme. A chooses m = (m0;:::;mk 1), encodes it into a codeword
c = (c0;:::;cn 1), and derives a key K from m. Then A selects p node-disjoint paths between A
and B. A divides the n symbols into R groups. Group j contains rj symbols. It holds that
R X
j=1
rj = n:
A sends the n symbols in R rounds. In round j, the rj symbols in group j are sent over the p
paths. For each path i, A computes fraction parameters qi (0  qi  1), where
p X
i=1
qi = 1:
Then A sends rjqi symbols over path i in round j. In each round, if B can recover an m0 using all
the received symbols, then B derives a key K0 from m0, and runs an authentication protocol with
A over their direct link to verify if K = K0. A keeps on sending the codeword symbols until the
authentication protocol indicates that K0 = K or until all n symbols are sent.
The main purpose JERT is for A to send just enough symbols for B to recover K, instead of
transmitting all symbols as in the HM scheme. JERT may be thought of as an adaptive algorithm,
whereas HM is non-adaptive.
The security analysis in [5] discusses three attack scenarios:
1. All adversary nodes are passive. In this case, the probability that a given fraction of symbols
are received by the adversary nodes is computed.
2. All adversary nodes are active. In this case, the number of symbols that must be sent so that
B can recover the key is computed.
3. Some adversary nodes are active and some are passive. This case is not analyzed in [5], where
it is stated that an analysis of this case \would be quite complex".
In our schemes, we consider all possible attack scenarios. First, the adversary nodes cannot
make B accept an incorrect key, even if all the adversary nodes are active. Since B learns the
correct key, K, we only need to consider how much information the adversary nodes can derive
about K. For this analysis, we allow adversary nodes to be active or passive.
84 Two New Schemes for MPKE Based on Reed-Solomon Codes
In this section, we propose two multi-path key establishment schemes, Protocol 1 and Protocol
2. These protocols are obtained from a new PSMT protocol based on (n;k) RS codes. In Protocol
1, as in the HM scheme, A does not receive feedback from B. In Protocol 2, as in the JERT
scheme, A receives feedback from B. For both schemes, we are interested in nding the optimal
choice of (n;k) values such that B can recover a key with the desired entropy while A only transmits
the minimum possible number of bits (i.e., the transmission overhead is optimized).
As mentioned above, our schemes are based on RS codes over nite eld Fq. We assume that
q is xed and q  n in the chosen (n;k) RS code.
4.1 Protocol 1
Here are the details of our rst MPKE protocol, which is in fact a 1-round PSMT scheme if the
parameters are chosen appropriately. We refer to this protocol as Protocol 1.
1. A chooses a random message m = (m0;:::;mk 1) 2 Fk
q and encodes it into an RS codeword
c = (c0;:::;cn 1) 2 Fn
q .
2. A sends the n codeword symbols over p pre-specied node-disjoint paths. Note that the
number of symbols sent over any path is either dn
pe or bn
pc.
3. B decodes the received symbols to a codeword c0. Then a message m0 is derived from c0.
Finally, a key K0 is derived from m using a pre-specied key derivation function.
We discuss feasible and optimal choices of (n;k) values in Section 4.1.1.
Remark. When B receives a symbol ci, B also needs to know its index i for decoding purposes
(this applies to the HM scheme and JERT as well). This objective could be accomplished, for
example, if A and B have some synchronization mechanism. In any event, we assume that B has
some reliable means of knowing the index of any received symbol.
4.1.1 Analysis and Optimization
Our goal is that the key K (derived from m) has entropy ` symbols if m has entropy at least `
symbols. We will derive conditions to ensure that m has entropy at least ` symbols. Then the key
derivation function is just a (k;`;k   `;q)-RF, obtained from Corollary 2.2. This would provide A
and B with an unconditionally secure key in F`
q.
Suppose there are p node-disjoint paths from A to B and pa of these paths contain an adversary
node. Therefore the error rate is e = pa=p. For simplicity, assume that n=p is an integer. Then in
Protocol 1, n=p  pa = ne symbols will be received by adversary nodes. These ne symbols may
be altered or deleted.
First, we derive a condition to ensure reliability (i.e., so that B can correctly compute the key
K). Since altering symbols makes it most dicult for B to recover m, we assume that these ne
symbols are all altered. For B to be able to correctly recover m, the condition (3) becomes
ne 
n   k
2
: (4)
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Remark. If the scheme satises (4), then it is already a prefectly reliable message transmission
scheme (for a denition, see [17]).
Now we consider secrecy of the transmitted message. In order for m to have entropy at least `
symbols, we require that
k   ne  `: (5)
Using the fact that the desired entropy ` > 0, it can be seen that (4) and (5) together imply
that
k
1   2e
 n <
k
e
;
which yields e < 1=3.
So hereinafter we assume that e < 1=3. Under this assumption, (4) and (5) are equivalent to
k   `
e
 n 
k
1   2e
: (6)
The inequalities in (6) provide the conditions under which B can compute a key with entropy at
least ` symbols. Note that (6) can equivalently be expressed as follows:
n(1   2e)  k  ` + ne: (7)
Suppose a value ` is xed. Then we dene an ordered pair (n;k) to be e-feasible if (6) (equiva-
lently, (7)) is satised.
Given ` and e, the set of all e-feasible ordered pairs form a region, a typical example of which
is indicated by the shadowed area in Figure 1. The optimal solution will be an ordered pair of
integers (n;k) that is close to the ordered pair (nmin;kmin), which denotes the intersection of the
two lines k = n(1   2e)and k = ` + ne. It is easy to compute
nmin =
`
1   3e
and kmin =
`(1   2e)
1   3e
: (8)
Clearly nmin > 0 and kmin > 0 because e < 1=3. nmin represents the optimal transmission size in
the protocol.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose ` is a positive integer and 0  e < 1=3. Suppose (n;k) is e-feasible.
Finally, suppose that there are p disjoint paths from A to B, where pa = pe of these paths are
controlled by the adversary. Suppose that n=p is an integer. Then Protocol 1 yields an `-secure
secret key. The total transmission of Protocol 1 consists of n symbols.
If we apply Protocol 1 with (n;k) = (nmin;kmin), then the transmission overhead is
n
`
=
1
1   3e
=
p
p   3pa
;
which is optimal, by (1).
Protocol 1 is analyzed in terms of the error rate e. In general, the error rate will not be known.
In practice, Alice and Bob would choose a value e < 1=3 which they hope is an upper bound on
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Figure 1: e-feasible ordered pairs (n;k) for given error rate e and desired key entropy `.
e. They would then execute Protocol 1 with an e-feasible ordered pair (n;k). It is easy to see
that an e-feasible ordered pair is also e-feasible provided that 0  e  e, so Protocol 1 will still
work correctly in these circumstances.
Example. Suppose that e = 1=5, p = 5 and ` = 40. Then we can take n = 100 and k = 40 in
Theorem 4.1. That is, we obtain a 40-secure key using a (100;40) RS code under the assumption
that at most one of ve node-disjoint paths joining A and B contains an adversary node.
4.2 Protocol 2
In Protocol 1, if the actual error rate e < e, then the protocol might transmit more information
than is actually necessary, i.e., the eciency might not be optimal. To reduce the number of
transmitted symbols, A can use feedback from B. This idea was rst proposed in JERT [5]. JERT
is designed for two neighbouring nodes that can communicate directly. It is assumed that the
channel connecting A and B is a boradcast channel. Therefore, it provides data integrity, but no
condentiality or data origin authentication. The lack of condentiality or authentication is not a
problem, as this channel is used only for message authentication. We assume a similar channel in
our protocol.
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e be the maximum error rate that the protocol is designed for (i.e., an e-feasible ordered pair
(n;k) is chosen for use in the protocol). As before, assume that there are p node-disjoint paths from
A to B and assume for convenience that p j n. In Protocol 2, MAC denotes a secure message
authentication protocol.
1. A chooses a random message m = (m0;:::;mk 1) 2 Fk
q and encodes it into an RS codeword
c = (c0;:::;cn 1) 2 Fn
q .
2. In each of n=p rounds, A sends one codeword symbol over each of the p pre-specied node-
disjoint paths.
3. After each round, B attempts to decode the symbols he has received in the current and all
previous rounds to a codeword c0. If he is successful, then a message m0 is derived from c0
and a key K0 is derived from m0 using the key derivation function.
4. If B is able to compute a (possible) key K0, then B informs A that he has done so. A sends
a (new) random challenge r to B. B computes y = MAC K0(r) and sends y to A. A accepts
y if y = MAC K(r) and noties B of her acceptance (or not) of y.
5. If A accepts y, then A and B have a shared secret key K and the protocol terminates.
Otherwise, A proceeds to the next round.
Remark. This protocol is also secure against mobile adversaries. (A mobile adversary is allowed
to compromise dierent nodes in dierent rounds, subject to the constraint that the error rate is
at most e in any given round.)
Protocol 2 is computationally secure whenever MAC is a computationally secure message
authentication code. It would be possible to analyze Protocol 2 in the setting of unconditional
security, by employing an unconditionally secure message authentication code. This analysis would
be required to take into account the fact that usage of a key in an unconditionally secure MAC
\leaks" information about the key. However, as noted in Section 2.2, a \practical" MPKE scheme
will not be unconditionally secure, so we do not pursue this theme further in this paper.
4.2.1 Analysis
First, let's consider the properties of security and reliability. It is certainly possible that B computes
an incorrect key, but he will not accept a wrong key (except with very small probability) due to the
challenge-response that utilizes the new key to construct a MAC on the new random challenge r.
Eventually, after some number of rounds, B will be able to compute the correct key provided that
e  e (for details, see below). Therefore Protocol 2 achieves reliability. Secrecy follows from the
same analysis as for Protocol 1.
Next, we analyze the eciency of Protocol 2 by determining the number of rounds required
for B to be able to compute the correct key K. After r rounds, B has received rp symbols, at most
rpe of which have been altered. The number of symbols which have not yet been transmitted to B
is n   pr. Thus B has a received vector in which   per and  = n   pr. Referring to (3), B can
correctly decode this received vector if
2rpe + n   pr  n   k;
12which is equivalent to
r 
k
p(1   2e)
: (9)
Therefore the correct key is computed by B after at most dk=(p(1   2e))e rounds. It follows that
the speedup factor of Protocol 2 as compared to Protocol 1 is
1   2e
1   2e
:
If e = e, then the number of rounds required is dk=(p(1   2e))e. If e = 0, then the number of
rounds required is dk=pe.
Summarizing the above discussion, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose ` is a positive integer and 0 < e  e < 1=3 and suppose (n;k) is e-
feasible. Suppose that there are p disjoint paths from A to B, where pa = pe of these paths are
controlled by the adversary. Then Protocol 2 yields an `-secure secret key. The total transmission
of Protocol 2 consists of (roughly) n(1   2e)=(1   2e) symbols.
Remark. In practice, B would not attempt to decode the received vector after every round. The
exact error rate e = pa=p, where pa  pe is an integer. Using (9), we see that it is sucient for B
to decode a received vector only when a round r has the form
r =
2
6 6
6
k
p

1   2i
p

3
7 7
7
=

k
p   2i

for some integer i  0.
5 A Scheme Tolerating Error Rate < 1=2
Both of our protocols described in Section 4 assume that the number of paths controlled by the
adversary is less than a 1=3 fraction of the number of paths connecting A and B. A higher fraction
(less than 1=2) of paths controlled by the adversary could be tolerated by using appropriate message
transmission schemes mentioned in Section 2.1. These schemes either require additional rounds of
communication or they are not perfectly reliable. They are also somewhat complicated and/or
inecient. In this section, we present a new 2-round protocol for a weakened version of message
transmission which is very simple and ecient, and well-suited for application as a MPKE scheme.
Our protocol will be computationally secure provided that certain specied ingredients exist.
Our scheme has the following properties:
 We assume that A and B are joined by p node-disjoint paths, at most pa of which are
controlled the adversary, where p  2pa + 1.
 We require a mapping h : K ! T , where K is the key component space and T is the tag space.
We will take K = Fq for some prime power q  p.
 The scheme is perfectly reliable if h is injective (in this case, the scheme enables A and B to
establish a shared key K 2 K with probability equal to 1 independent of any computationl
assumptions). The scheme is (computationally) reliable if h is second-preimage resistant.
13 Under the assumption that h is a random function, the scheme provides secrecy of the es-
tablished key. (For a random function, a computationally-bounded adversary is unable to
compute any non-negligible information about a secret value L, when the adversary is given
only the value h(L).)
 The scheme is a two-round scheme.
Here is the protocol, which we term Protocol 3.
1. For 1  i  p, A chooses a key component Li 2 K independently and uniformly at random.
Then A computes hi = h(Li), i = 1;:::;p.
2. For 1  i  p, A sends Li over the ith path. Also, for 1  i;j  p, i 6= j, A denes hi;j = hi
and sends hi;j over the jth path.
3. (a) For 1  i  p, B computes
check(i) = fj : hi;j = h(Li)g:
(b) B accepts Li if and only if jcheck(i)j  p   pa   1.
(c) B denes
accept = fi : B accepts Lig
and n = jacceptj.
(d) B denes m = (Li : i 2 accept).
(e) B computes K = f(m), where f is an (n;p   pa;n   (p   pa);q)-resilient function.
4. B transmits accept to A over every one of the p paths.
5. (a) A determines accept, as it will be correctly received over at least p   pa paths (i.e., a
majority of the paths).
(b) A computes m and K exactly as B did.
Remark. As described above, Protocol 3 is not a message transmission scheme due to the fact
that the value of the derived key, K, is not specied a priori; its value depends on possible actions
of the adversary. This is sucient for the goals of an MPKE scheme. However, if desired, it
is easy to use a standard trick to make a minor alteration to our scheme in order to transmit a
predetermined key K from A to B. Namely, the protocol would be initiated by B (instead of A),
and in the second round, A would send K + K to B along with accept.
Remark. In practice, we could take h to be a second preimage-resistant and one-way hash function.
Another alternative is to let h be a semantically secure public-key cryptosystem with randomly
chosen public key, in which case h would be injective.
145.1 Analysis
First, we show that if B accepts a key component Li, then it was not altered by the adversary.
Suppose that the adversary replaces Li by a dierent value L0
i. Assuming that h is injective, we
have that h(L0
i) 6= h(Li). In order for the adversary to make B accept L0
i (in step 3(b)), he would
have to change at least p   pa   1 of the p   1 values hi;j (j 6= i). But if the adversary controls pi.
then the adversary controls at most pa   1 of the other p   1 paths. We have pa   1 < p   pa   1
because p  2pa + 1. Therefore, in this situation, the scheme is perfectly reliable.
If h is not injective but it is second-preimage resistant, then a computationally-bounded adver-
sary is unable to nd L0
i such that h(L0
i) = h(Li), even if such L0
i exist. The scheme is (computa-
tionally) reliable in this case.
It remains to evaluate the secrecy of the derived key K. First, we observe that if the adversary
does not control the ith path, then he cannot determine any information about the key component
Li. This is because we are assuming that h is a random mapping. Now, let r denote the number
of rejected key components; r = p   a. Any rejected key component lies on a path controlled by
the adversary. Therefore the number of accepted key components that lie on paths controlled by
the adversary is at most pa   r = n   (p   pa). Now, the n-tuple m contains at most n   (p   pa)
components that are known to the adversary. Hence, application of a (n;p   pa;n   (p   pa);q)-
resilient function will yield a key whose entropy is p pa symbols. This resilient function exists by
Corollary 2.2.
Finally, A is also able to compute K because A is able to correctly determine the set accept
after receiving p copies of it from B (at most pa of these copies are altered by the adversary, so the
correct accept can be determined by majority rule).
Let's next analyze the transmission overhead of the scheme. For the purpose of this analysis,
assume that jKj is (jT j). Then the derived key has entropy p pa symbols and the total transmis-
sion from A to B is (p2) symbols. The total transmission from B to A is p2 bits (the set accept
can be represented as a bitstring of length p). Since q  p, this is at most p symbols. So the total
transmission is (p2) symbols, and the transmission overhead is at most


p2
p   pa

:
Since p   pa > p=2, the transmission overhead is (p).
Theorem 5.1. Suppose ` is a positive integer and 0  e < 1=2. Suppose that there are p disjoint
paths from A to B, where pa = pe of these paths are controlled by the adversary. Then Protocol 3
yields a (p pa)-secure secret key. The total transmission of Protocol 3 consists of (p2) symbols,
and the transmission overhead is (p).
6 Conclusion
We proposed an enhanced security model to capture attacks against multi-path key establishment
schemes in sensor networks. We identied two security objectives, which we term reliability and
secrecy, that should be achieved. We observed that these objectives could be realized using perfectly
secure message transmission schemes.
Next, we proposed a new, optimal one-round PSMT scheme using Reed-Solomon codes, and
we constructed two new multi-path key establishment schemes based on it. Both MPKE schemes
15achieve the desired objectives in an ecient manner. The second protocol potentially reduces the
communication complexity in some cases by using feedback involving a message authentication
code. Both of these protocols assume that the number of adversary-controlled paths is less than a
1=3 fraction of the number of paths connecting A and B.
Finally, we described another MPKE scheme that tolerates a higher fraction (less than 1=2) of
paths controlled by the adversary. This scheme is based on a new protocol for a weakened version
of message transmission, which is very simple and ecient.
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